In this paper we study the relationship between fertility behavior and the process of marriage duration. The potential endogeneity of fertility on marriage behavior is taken into account by modeling fertility and divorce jointly. We apply the "timing-of-event" method (Abbring & van den Berg (2002) ) to identify the causal effect of births on the divorce hazard. We show that couples who are less prone to divorce are more prone to invest in children, and therefore one might (mistakenly) conclude that children tend to stabilize marriages. However, when correcting for the selectivity bias arising from the fertility decision, we conclude that children themselves do not have a positive effect on marriage duration. JEL classification: J12, C3
Introduction
Do children stabilize marriages? Raw data sets typically suggest that they do. Gross divorce rates are in general lower for couples with children than for their childless counterparts. When the association between the two processes; marital status and birth timing is investigated more thoroughly, the answers are more dispersed. Two branches of empirical literature have emerged. The first branch pursues a reduced-form strategy and simply includes various children regressors in models of marital dissolution.
The second branch raises the concern that these regressors might be endogenous. The decision to invest in children is presumably not independent of the quality of the current match and hence the probability of subsequent divorce (see e.g. Becker et al. (1977) , Weiss (1997) and Vuri (2001a,b) for theoretical models that support this hypothesis).
Different empirical approaches have been suggested to model the potential endogeneity of fertility in models of marital dissolution. Koo & Janowitz (1983) were the first to address the simultaneous relationship between fertility and marital dissolution. They model a simultaneous logit model of the probability of separation and of having a birth in a brief period. They find neither that the number of children or the age of the youngest child affects the divorce probability nor that separations affect childbearing throughout marriage. The logit model is not very well suited for estimation of dynamic processes as timing of birth and divorce. Lillard & Waite (1993) improve upon this by specifying and estimating a bivariate duration model where the two processes of interest are allowed to be dependent. They argue that in order to identify their model exclusionary restrictions and/or functional form assumptions are required. They find that the fertility decision and the divorce risk are negatively correlated as suggested by the theory, i.e. couples who are more prone to divorce are less likely to invest in marital-specific capital, as constituted by children.
After correcting for endogeneity of children, they find that the first child has a stabilizing effect on marriages, whereas second and higher order children have destabilizing effects. Recently, Vuri (2001a,b) and Jacobsen et al. (2001) have objected to the ap-proach by Lillard & Waite (1993) since, as they claim, it requires plausible identifying restrictions which can be hard to find in the data. Instead, Vuri (2001b) analyzes the association between children and divorce inspired by the treatment-outcome literature.
The treatment being the arrival of a(nother) child and the outcome being the continuation of marriages. The identifying assumption in Vuri's formulation is the notion of conditional independence, which implies that data include all systematic determinants of the process of treatment assignment (the birth of a child), so that, conditional on these observables, the remaining observed variation in the treatment assignment is uncorrelated with the determinants of the outcome variable (in this case the event of divorce). An example of this approach is the application of the matching method. In contrast to Lillard & Waite (1993) , this approach only conditions on observed characteristics and not on unobservable components of the processes. Applying the matching approach in terms of the propensity score method, Vuri (2001b) finds that the presence of children does stabilize marriages, and that this is mainly due to a very positive effect from the first child. of the appropriate data it is possible to identify treatment effects in duration models, like the effect of children on the divorce risk, without either exclusionary restriction, conditional independence or parametric functional-form assumptions. What is required from the data is that the timing of events (births) differs across individuals. In the present application that is indeed the case.
In the present paper, we investigate whether the presence of children stabilizes marriages in the Danish marriage market. We identify the causal effect of children on the divorce risk assisted by the timing-of-events method and a register-based data set. We find, without correcting for the potential endogeneity problem, that children stabilize marriages, but that this effect is due to negative correlation between the two processes; marriage continuation and birth timing. When this correlation is taken into account, we find no stabilizing effect of children on marriages. When these results are compared to previous analyses using similar methods, our conclusions still differ. We discuss how this result could be due to specific characteristics in the Danish marriage markets like labour force participation of mothers and institutional settings for the benefit of households with children.
Section 2 presents the background of our analysis in terms of the theoretical underpinnings and the related empirical literature. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 outlines the empirical specification and discusses identification issues in more depth.
Section 5 contains the main results, and Section 6 concludes.
Background

Theory
Why should children stabilize marriages? According to Becker (1998) , marriage is seen as a voluntary arrangement between two adults with the purpose of joint consumption and joint production. The higher the value of marriage, all other things equal, the less likely it is that the marriage breaks up. In order to achieve a higher value of the marriage, the couple can choose to invest in the relationship. The perhaps most important investment, at least a very long-term investment, is children. Children represent, according to Becker, a marital-specific investment since they belong to the couple rather than either one of the partners, which also implies that the value to both partners of having children is not fully preserved outside marriage. Accordingly, the arrival of children therefore implies that the expected gain from marriage increases and that divorce is discouraged. Becker et al. (1977) argue and prove 1 that the causality runs in both directions: the possibility of divorce also discourages the accumulation of marital-specific capital. This feature has recently been modelled more rigourously by Weiss (1997) and Vuri (2001a) . Weiss (1997) introduces the notion of defensive investment which simply suggests 1 In the 1976 NBER working paper version of the paper.
that investment in children is hampered if prospects of divorce are high. In the model, fertility (and child quality) requires input of time and money by parents in the first period, and child quality requires input of time and money by parents in the second period. Also, the parents' wages in the second period depend on how much they worked in the first period (i.e. there is positive returns to experience in the labour market). In the second period, new information is available, which could induce the dissolution of the marriage. In the model, fertility in the first period, wages in the second period and the probability of divorce are therefore jointly determined.
Vuri (2001a) also addresses the two processes in a two-period model. In the first period, the couple observes a noicy signal of the true quality of the marriage. Based on this signal, the couple decides how many children, if any, to have. In the second period, the true value of the match is revealed and the couple decides to divorce or not. This decision is guided by comparison of the utilities obtained by continuing the marriages or by entering the single state. These utilities depend on the amount of children produced in the first period. Vuri (2001a) shows that couples with children are less likely to divorce, and that couples with higher ex-ante divorce probabilities are less likely to give birth to children.
To sum-up, the theoretical literature suggests that children are stabilizing marriages, but that the decision to have children depends on the percieved match quality.
Empirical literature
Are children found to stabilize marriages? Surprisingly, given the unambiguous effect derived from the theoretical literature, the empirical studies on the effect of children on marital dissolution do not offer a consensus on the nature or direction of these effects. for older cohorts the divorce probability actually decreases with number of children, whereas the opposite is true for younger cohorts.
The more structural 2 oriented empirical literature was initiated by Koo & Janowitz (1983) . They model a simultaneous logit model of the probability of separation and of having a birth in a brief period. They find that neither number of children or age of the youngest child affects the divorce probability nor that separations affect childbearing throughout marriage. The logit model is not very well suited for estimation of dynamic processes as timing of birth and divorce. Lillard & Waite (1993) improve upon this by specifying and estimating a bivariate duration model in which the two processes of interest are allowed to be dependent. They find, that the fertility decision and the divorce risk are negatively correlated, i.e. couples who are more prone to divorce are less likely to invest in children. After correcting for endogeneity of children, they find that the first child has a stabilizing effect on marriages, whereas second and higher order children have destabilizing effects. Comparing different family compositions, they show that families with 1 child, all other things equal, have the highest probability of continuing beyond their 12th anniversary. In terms of marriage survival probabilities, this family type is followed by families with either two or no children.
Families with 3 children have the lowest marriage survival probability among these 2 We will refer to models that endogenize fertility in the divorce equations as structural models.
The models are not structural in the sense that we are recovering the deep structural parameters. The notation merely reflects that we are imposing dependency between the birth process and the divorce process.
families. Vuri (2001b) analyzes the association between children and divorce inspired by the treatment-outcome literature. The treatment being the arrival of a(nother) child and the outcome being the continuation of marriages. The identifying assumption in
Vuri's formulation is the notion of conditional independence, which implies that data include all systematic determinants of the process of treatment assignment (the birth of a child), so that, conditional on these observables, the remaining observed variation in the treatment assignment is uncorrelated with the determinants of the outcome variable (in this case the event of divorce). She finds that having children reduces the probability of divorce. In terms of additional children, she finds that having another child (on average) reduces the probability of marital dissolution, but that this result seems to be driven mainly by the negative effect that having children in the first place has on divorce while higher order children only slightly affect the divorce risk.
In sum, the literature mentioned in this section suggests that (i) children are endogenous to the marital dissolution and that (ii) children born to the couple tend to stabilize marriages. In this paper, we take a closer look at the association between children and marital status following the tradition in the structural branch of the literature. Our analysis is based on a rich register-based data set that, compared to the data sets used in the structural part of the literature, contains both economic variables and 
Data
The data used in this study come from IDA ( sharing a flat, say, without being a couple, it will still count as cohabitation in the data.
The only way we can ascertain that individuals living together actually are partners is to consider married couples only. In this study, we therefore restrict focus to marriages.
Of course, married couples who are not living together will be registered as single, but this type of relationships is likely to be low in number. If there is a break in a marriage, e.g. we observe a couple to be married in 1987, to live as single individuals in 1988
and then as a married couple again in 1989, we disregard the break and contribute the intervening spell to measurement error.
The information used in the analysis is gathered in the following way: we observe the individuals in 1980, where we have information about various personal characteristics and marriage market status. For each subsequent year, we observe a new stream of data for the individuals. If the individual enters a relationship, we also observe the personal characteristics of the partner. Since we are interested in marriages, and especially the personal characteristics during the marriage, we disregard left-censored marriages. Table 1 shows the distribution of marriages, and it is worth noticing that very few individuals experience more than 1 marriage in the sample period 
Fertility data
Information about fertility is obtained from a fertility database administered by Statistics Denmark. The database contains information about all births in Denmark. For each birth, we have information about the identity of the mother. We know the sex of the child, the date of birth and whether it was a twin birth. On top of that, we also have information about the identity if the father. The latter information is captured from each child birth certificate. Here the name of the father is stated. In 96% of the births, the information is actually provided. Based on this information, we are able to identify all children born to the couple, whether the couple is married or not. In addition, we can see if either of the partners in a specific marriage has children from previous relationships.
The stream of information about births enables us to construct variables that very precisely describe the individual birth history of each individual in our sample. In Table   2 , the resulting distribution of children born in the observational period is presented.
It should be noted that this distribution is clearly not equal to the distribution of completed fertility. 
Fertility and divorce
The main topic of this paper is to analyse the relationship between fertility and divorce.
In this subsection, we present some associations between fertility and divorce. Table 3 shows the divorce rate for different family types depending on the number of children born in the marriage. The overall divorce rate 3 in the sample is 18%. However, the divorce rate does not seem to be independent of the number of children born within the marriage. The divorce rate of the marriages with no children is 23% and this declines steadily with the number of children and is as low as 4% for marriages with 3 children.
This clearly indicates that, all other things equal, marriages with a higher level of investment in children are stable or the reverse, namely that it is only the high-quality marriages that have (several) children. Eventhough relatively few of the individuals in the sample experience more than 1 marriage in the sample period, in 19% of the marriages at least one of the partners has children from an earlier relationship. Becker et al. (1977) argue that stepchildren may constitute negative capital to the marriage and hence should tend to be a destabilizing factor of the marriage. This hypothesis is confirmed in a number of studies (see e.g. White & Booth (1985) ). In our data, the divorce rate for marriages with stepchildren is 24.6% and 15.1% for marriages with no stepchildren.
Empirical model
We are interested in the causal effect of children on the exit rate out of marriages.
Since both the process that leads to births and the process that leads to divorce are dynamic by nature, we follow the econometric approach described in Lillard (1993) and Lillard & Waite (1993) and model the two processes by a bivariate duration model. In these models, it is claimed that in order to identify the causal effect, either functional 
Timing-of-events method
The timing-of-events method enables us to identify the causal effect of children on the divorce rate under some well-defined assumptions which we return to below. The esti- This rules out that t b affects h m (t|t b , x, v) for t ≤ t b , i.e. this implies that anticipation of the birth has no effect on the marriage hazard. This assumption is clearly a bit strong in the context of births, since births normally are announced around 9 months prior to 4 The hazard rate is defined as the rate at which individuals leave the current stage:
delivery. However, as noted by Abbring & van den Berg (2002) , the time span between the moment at which the anticipation occurs and the moment of the actual delivery is short relative to the duration of marriages which implies that the potential bias in the effect of children on the marriage hazard presumably is rather small.
Given the independence and no anticipation assumptions, the causal effect of children on the hazard out of marriage is identified by a mixed proportional hazard model.
That is, it is a product of a function of time spent in the given event (the baseline hazard), a function of observed time-varying characteristics, x t , and a function of un-
where λ (t) is the baseline hazard and ϕ (x t , v) is the scaling function specified as
More specifically the system of equations is:
where
) is a vector of time-varying indicator variables.
is 0 until the first birth in the current marriage, hereafter it takes the value 1.
is 0 until the second birth in the current marriage, hereafter it takes the value 1.
is 0 until the third birth in the current marriage, hereafter it takes the value 1.
The timing-of-events method provides identification on single-spell data. That is, the data set does not need to contain multiple spells of either fertility or marriage to identify the correlation between the two processes. This is a remarkeble improvement compared to earlier models. In Lillard & Waite (1993) , it is assumed that the unob- Intuitively, the timing-of-events method uses variation in marriage duration and in duration until birth (conditional on observed characteristics) to identify the unobserved heterogeneity distribution.
Likelihood function
Since we only observe the transitions on a yearly basis, we specify a model for grouped duration data (see e.g. Kiefer (1990) ). The duration T e , e = b, m is observed to lie in one of K e intervals, with the k e 'th interval being (t k−1,e ; t k,e ] and the convention t 0 = 0 for k e = 1, ..., 15. The probability that the duration T e for an individual with explanatory variables x e,t and unobserved characteristics v e is greater than t k,e given that the duration is greater than t k−1,e is given by:
where Λ e,k e = R t k,e t k−1,e λ e (t)dt. The interval-specific survivor expression (4) is henceforth denoted α e,k e . The probability of observing a given event in interval k e , conditional on survival until T e > t k−1,e , is consequently 1 − α e,k e . If we do not specify a functional form for the baseline hazard within the interval, the Λ k,e s are just parameters to be estimated.
Given that the observed covariates are time-invariant within intervals (i.e. years),
we can now express the interval-specific survivor probabilities as
exp(λ i (t))dt is simply estimated as the average baseline hazard in the given interval.
First, notice that each marriage contributes to the likelihood function as long as the marriage is intact. The contribution to the likelihood function from the marriage duration alone is therefore 
Combining the two expressions yield the full likelihood function
where G(v m , v b ) is the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity components.
In the present application, we impose two restrictions on G(·): We normalize one of the support points in each of the cause-specific hazard functions to zero, since the baseline hazard acts as a constant term. The second assumption restricts the correlation between the unobservables in the two hazard functions to be either -1 or 1.
Empirical findings
In this section, the empirical results are presented. Our main interest is the association between children and the divorce rate. In Table 4 , we present the results from two different models. In the first model, we follow the reduced-form literature and estimate the fertility and divorce equations separately, in the second model we consider the two equations simultaneously. We only present the coefficients for the child variables.
Besides these variables, we condition on a long range of other covariates. The choice of covariates is based on what is usually applied in the fertility model literature (see e.g. Heckman & Walker (1990) ) and the divorce model literature (see e.g. Svarer (2002a)). 7 The complete set of results can be found in Appendix 1. 6 Theoretically, it is not required that the correlation structure is assumed to be perfect. However, empirically it is much easier to identify a more restricted correlation structure. As shown in e.g.
Rosholm & Svarer (2001), this crucially depends on the amount of multiple observations per individual.
In our sample very few individuals experience more than 1 marriage, therefore we restrict the correlation structure from the outset. 7 Since the timing-of-events method does not require exclusionary restrictions on observed characteristics to identify the causal effect of children, we include the same covariates in the fertility and divorce equation. This implies that the identified effect of children on the divorce risk is not driven by instrumental variables. For summary statistics of the included explanatory variables see Table 5 in Appendix 1. A postive coefficient implies a positive effect on the hazard. The inclusion of birth order indicators in the fertility model (first, second and third births) identifies the marginal effect of a given birth on the duration until the next birth (hence, they are to be added to get the total effect). Hence, the finding of a negative effect of the first and second births in the reduced-form model indicates that the likelihood of a second or third order birth is lower than that of the first birth, which is perfectly consistent with the distribution of children in the sample. The coefficient of the indicators of third and higher order births is positive but insignificant, and this result presumably is due to the low incidence of higher order births in our sample. Both the presence of stepchildren and a premarital birth decrease the fertility hazard. In the divorce hazard, all three child indicators have highly significant negative marginal effects and the order of magnitude reflects that the birth of the second child stabilizes more than the first birth and that the third birth is even more stabilizing. Hence, according to the simple specification the prediction is quite clear: Children have a stabilizing effect on marriages. However, the potential endogeneity of the fertility decision is not taken into account in this specification and if the child indicators are endogenous, the coefficient estimates are likely to be biased. Furthermore, according to this model the presence of a stepchild has a destabilizing impact on the marriage, whereas a premarital birth to the couple has no significant impact on the marriage duration.The results from the structural model in which the two processes are modelled simultaneously reveal that the specification of the model is crucial to the conclusion of the impact of children on divorce behavior. In the fertility equation, the two first birth order indicators decrease the likelihood of another child. For the third birth, however, no significant effect is found for higher order births. These qualitative results are in line with the results of the separate fertility model, though the effects are stronger in the joint model. What is more remarkable is that the results for the divorce hazard change considerably. In the structural model, we find that the effect of the birth indicator for the first birth is positive, the effect of a second birth is insignificant, hence the total positive effect remains after a second birth. The marginal effect of a third birth is significant and very negative, resulting in a net effect which is negative. This means that, when the simultaneity of divorce and fertility decisions are taken into account, the arrivals of the first and second born children do not in themselves have a positive effect on marriage duration.
The coefficient of the stepchild indicator is positive indicating that the presence of stepchildren is bad for the marriage, which is also the case for premarital births. 9 These results are in line with other studies in the literature.
In the joint specification of the model, the correlation between the unobservables is estimated to be negative. This means that marriages, in which the fertility is likely to be high (in terms of unobserved characteristics to the marriage), are less likely to divorce.
Together with the results from the observed heterogeneity, this serves to conclude that it is not the presence of children as such that tends to stabilize marriages (which is found, when simultaneity is not taken into account). Actually, these results indicate that children only stabilize to the extent that couples in good matches choose to have plain why her results differ compared to the findings in this paper. First, the empirical 9 It should be noted that premarital births also could be endogenous to the divorce decision. Our data configuration, however, does not allow us to endogenize births prior to marriage because we are not able to perfect identify whether a couple who are registered as cohabiting has a relationsship.
Cohabiting couples also consist of individuals that are just sharing the same housing unit. models differ. Vuri (2001b) assumes conditional independence to obtain identification.
This assumption implies that the data are able to capture all systematic determinants of the birth process, so that the remaining observed variation in births is independent of the determinants of divorce. This assumption may be a bit difficult to justify. Being in a marriage with a bad tempered husband say, a feature unobservable to the researcher, might induce the wife both to avoid births and to end the marriage. Second, the results in Vuri (2001b) are based on data from the British, the German and the US marriage market. Differences in characteristics of these countries and Denmark in terms of e.g child support, labour force participation of mothers, access to day care etc. could of course also contribute to the different results, we will return to these issues below. With respect to Lillard (1993) and Lillard & Waite (1993) , our result are readily comparable since we are both identifying the causal effect in a proportional hazard model relying on correlation between the unobservable part of the two processes. Still, the effect of children on the divorce risk differs. They find that the first child stabilizes marriages, whereas additional children do not. Again, the difference could be attributed to differ- older cohorts who began their marriage in the 1950s, the divorce probability actually decreases with number of children, whereas the opposite is true for younger cohorts.
Child benefits and women's economic independence
An explanation for the diverging results concerning the effect of children on divorce risk could be attributed to different institutional characteristics related to families with children and the degree of economic independence of mothers in the different marriage markets. In this section we will briefly relate the findings within this field to our results.
Recently, Bradshaw & Finch (2002) have compared "child benefit packages" in 22
countries including Denmark, the UK and the US. The results presented in this paper show that couples who are less prone to divorce are more prone to invest in children, and therefore children tend to stabilize marriages.
However, when correcting for this selectivity bias, children in themselves do not have a positive effect on marriage duration.
In sum, the results in this article confirm what papers in the more structural-oriented literature on the effect of children on divorce have found, namely, that the two processes should not be considered independently. When they are considered independently, as in the more reduced-form part of the literature, the estimated effects are likely to be biased.
A bias that could explain why different results are found in different applications. Still, the findings in this paper suggest, that endogenizing fertility is not sufficient to align results. We present cross-country data showing that Danish mothers of pre-school children -compared to mothers of pre-school children in other OECD countries -have more favorable conditions in terms of child benefits and labour force participation in case they decide to divorce their present spouse. In addition, the development in e.g. 
